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Abstract. We present an experimental study of complex decentralized one-to-one
matching markets, such as labor or marriage markets. In our experiments, subjects are
informed of everyones preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match o¤ers that
are realized only when a certain period of market inactivity has elapsed. We nd three
main results. First, stable matches are the prevalent outcome. Second, in markets with
multiple stable matches, the median stable match is selected most frequently. Third, the
cardinal representation of ordinal preferences substantially impacts which stable match
gets selected. Furthermore, the endogenous dynamic paths that lead to stability exhibit
several persistent features.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview. Matching theory is widely used as a normative guide in the eld of mar-
ket design, and as a positive tool o¤ering predictions that can be tested in sociological and
economic investigations. The current paper o¤ers an experimental inquiry of the predictive
power of matching theory for decentralized matching markets. Concretely, we study whether
a decentralized market will reach a stable matching outcome, and if so, which stable matching
will be selected.1 We are also interested in the endogenous market dynamics that takes place
in decentralized settings.
Much of the extant literature on matching markets, both theoretical and empirical, has
investigated centralized markets: markets where a central clearinghouse dictates who matches
with whom. There are many examples in which matching markets are centralized (the medi-
cal residency match, school allocations, the U.S. market for reform rabbis, etc.). Nonetheless,
many centralized markets come after decentralized market interactions have taken place. Fur-
thermore, many markets are not fully centralized (college admissions in the U.S., the market
for law clerks, junior economists, and so on). The analysis of decentralized markets is therefore
critical to the design of institutions.
Stability is a central notion in the discussion of two-sided matching markets. In practice,
stable outcomes are frequently the goal for implementation. One of the leading reasons is
that systems that do not yield stable outcomes have been observed to lead to market collapse
through pre- or post-decentralized market interactions.2 In fact, folk arguments assert that
if market participants can interact freely at any stage, they will ultimately install (possibly
ine¢ ciently) a stable outcome. This argument has been used not only for dening the objec-
tive outcomes of matching institutions, but also for broader econometric exercises. Indeed,
the assumption that observed outcomes are stable can serve as the basis for estimating the
underlying preferences in the market.3
Recent theoretical work has studied decentralized markets and the conditions under which
1A matching is stable if no agent prefers to leave the market over their allocated match and no pair of
agents prefers to be matched to one another over their given match partners.
2The leading example is the unraveling and subsequent collapse of the market for medical interns, see Roth
and Sotomayor (1992). A more recent documented example is that of gastroenterology fellows, see Niederle
and Roth (2003).
3See, e.g., Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Choo and Siow (2006), Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim
(2006), and Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Ariely (2006).
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stable outcomes may make sense as market predictions.4 The empirical study of decentralized
markets has, however, been rather limited. Indeed, decentralized markets are challenging to
analyze using eld data preferences and information regarding preferences are unobserved by
the econometrician, and the protocol of market interactions is rarely available. Experiments
are useful in that they allow us to control for all of these elements.5
In addition, stable matchings are typically not unique, and there is no theory of equi-
librium selection for stable matchings. It is important to understand, at least empirically,
if markets systematically favor a stable matching with particular characteristics. All central-
ized mechanisms make a choice of which stable matching to implement. For example, in the
medical residency match, the stable matching that is best for the residents and worst for the
hospitals is implemented (if participants report their preferences truthfully). A decentralized
market might settle for a di¤erent stable outcome.
Our paper is an experimental investigation of two themes. The rst theme is stability:
will decentralized matching markets yield stable outcomes? The second theme is selection:
when there are multiple stable matchings, which one will be selected? What are the factors
a¤ecting the selection?
In our baseline experiments, each side of the market was composed of 8 subjects. Subjects
were fully informed of all participantscardinal preferences. Payo¤s were designed so that each
market participant had either one, two, or three stable match partners. Furthermore, for each
ordinal preference prole in the market, we designed several cardinal utility representations,
di¤ering in the utilitarian welfare of each side of the market as well as the marginal returns
from matching with one partner as opposed to a more preferred one. In each period of our
experiment, agents on each side were free to make match o¤ers to any agent on the other
side of the market (up to one o¤er at a time), as well as accept any o¤er that arrived (up to
one at a time). Markets ended after 30 seconds of inactivity. Payo¤s were then determined
according to the matches created, where unmatched agents received a payo¤ of 0:
We note that the (cooperative game) theory of one-to-one matching o¤ers predictions on
4See, e.g., Haeringer and Wooders (2009), Niederle and Yariv (2011), and references therein.
5There are a number of studies that document certain aspects of decentralized markets such as their timing,
see for example Roth and Xing (1997). Furthermore, there are various experimental studies that assess the
performance of particular (mostly centralized) matching markets. For example, Chen and Sonmez (2006),
Frechette, Roth, and Unver (2007), Nalbantian and Schotter (1995), and Niederle and Roth (2009).
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the set of plausible outcomes, namely the stable matchings (or the core), under two basic
premises on the underlying markets: that all agents are completely informed of other partici-
pantspreferences (as well as their own) and that agents can freely match with one another. In
that respect, our design aims at mimicking as much as possible these premises. In particular,
agents have complete information on everyones preferences and are free to make o¤ers to
one another in a rather unconstrained manner.6 The design allows us to inspect the organic
selection of stable outcomes, when they are reached, and the endogenous path that generates
them.
There are three main insights that come out of our experiments. First, stable outcomes
appear in a predominance of cases. 85% of our markets ended up in stable outcomes, whereas in
markets with one or two stable matchings, over 90% of the markets generated stable outcomes.
Furthermore, when markets did not yield a stable outcome, the resulting matchings were very
close to stable ones in terms of payo¤s and number of blocking pairs.7 Our markets are complex
enough that eyeballing a stable matching is arguably impossible (in fact, from a computational
perspective, nding the set of stable matchings is a hard problem). It is therefore interesting
that experimental markets nd a stable matching, and do so relatively quickly (in time, rarely
exceeding 5 minutes, as well as in o¤er volume, which averages 61 distinct o¤ers per market).
Second, in markets in which each agent had three stable match partners, the median stable
matching8 emerged as the modal outcome 73% of matched pairs corresponded to median
stable match partners. This is particularly interesting when contrasted with the leading
clearinghouses used in the eld (e.g., the variations of the Gale-Shapley, 1962, algorithm used
for the medical resident match in the U.S. and the U.K.) that implement a stable matching
that is the most preferred by one side of the market, assuming truthful reports of participants
preferences. Surprisingly, when we ran a treatment in which only one side of the market could
make o¤ers, the median matching is still selected most of the time.
6This is reminiscent in spirit of some of the original general equilibrium experiments, which examined
whether markets reach an equilibrium without imposing constraints on the sequential actions that lead them
there, see our discussion below.
7A blocking pair is one comprised of agents who both benet from matching with one another over staying
with their current match.
8Stable matchings are ordered so that there is a stable matching that is the most preferred to each side of
the market, and is precisely the least preferred to the other, the third, median, stable matching is ranked by
all the agents in between the other two.
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The last insight pertains to the selection and the cardinal representation of preferences.
Stability is an ordinal concept, and so the set of stable matchings in a market does not
depend on the precise match utilities each participant associates with their potential match
partners. In the lab, these cardinal representations have a clear e¤ect on the selection of stable
matchings. In particular, the side of the market that has more to loseby forgoing their most
preferred matching (say, because their marginal loss from shifting from their most preferred
stable matching to a less preferred one is greater than the other sides), tends to get their
most preferred matching more frequently.
In order to check for the robustness of these results, we ran two sets of additional treat-
ments. In the rst set we tested larger markets, ones containing 30 participants (with 15;
instead of 8, subjects on each side). The three insights still hold stable matches, and in
particular median stable matches, are frequent. In the second set, we allowed for only one
side of the market to make o¤ers. Indeed, in many decentralized markets (such as the market
for junior academic economists), only one side of the market e¤ectively makes o¤ers. We
observe similar results in these markets. Stable matchings still occur habitually at a rate of
87%. Furthermore, despite the absence of o¤ers from one side of the market, median stable
matchings remain the modal empirical outcome, occurring in 59% of the markets in which
agents had three stable match partners.
Our design also allows us to track the dynamic path by which our subjects reach stability.
As mentioned, subjects converge to a stable matching rather rapidly. We use several discrete
choice models to explain the making of and responses to o¤ers. We nd that subjects are
strategically sophisticated: when making an o¤er they seem to put themselves in the place of
the recipient of the o¤er, and gauge the likelihood that the o¤er is accepted. The interplay
between match utilities and the likelihood of o¤er acceptance seem to explain a substantial
portion of market activity.9
In what follows, we present a review of the related literature. We provide some basic
theoretical background in Section 2. We then describe our experimental design in Section 3.
9We also use simulations to examine whether dynamic models that have been o¤ered in the theoretical
literature t our data, namely the Roth and Vande Vate (1990) dynamics and the Gale-Shapley (1962) algo-
rithm with proposers that are randomly chosen. Neither seem to match properly the features of the empirical
dynamics.
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A description of the aggregate outcomes appears in Section 4, with an analysis of the impacts of
the cardinal representations of preferences appearing in Section 5. The experimental dynamics
and the corresponding individual behavior are studied in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2. Literature Review. The paper ties to two separate strands of literature: theoretical
and experimental. Theoretically, our experimental design corresponds to the cooperative game
theory model of matching markets (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). This setting has crisp
predictions: outcomes coincide with the core of the market, the set of stable matchings. In
that respect, our experimental results provide a strong conrmation of the theory underlying
the notion of stability.
Several recent papers propose particular dynamic decentralized processes by which one-to-
one matchings are created (see, e.g., Haeringer and Wooders, 2009, Niederle and Yariv, 2011,
and Pais, 2008). These papers usually impose some structure on the process by which o¤ers
are made and accepted (namely, o¤ers are made by only one side of the market). The main
focus of this literature is the identication of conditions under which stable outcomes are likely
to arise as equilibrium outcomes. Roughly speaking, complete information of the prevailing
preferences (as is the case in our experiments) allows for stability to emerge in equilibrium,
while a certain amount of correlation between agentspreferences is required for stability to
be the unique prediction. To the extent of our knowledge, the extant literature is silent on
the selection of stable matchings when multiple ones exist in the market.
Experimentally, there are fairly few laboratory studies of decentralized matching. Kagel
and Roth (2000) analyze the transition from decentralized matching to centralized clearing-
houses, when market features lead to ine¢ cient matching through unraveling. Nalbantian and
Schotter (1995) analyze several procedures for matching with transferable utility, decentral-
ized matching among them, where agents have private information about payo¤s. Nalbantian
and Schotter include private negotiations between potential match partners. O¤ers in our
treatment are private as well; only accepted o¤ers become public, but they are non-binding.
Pais, Pintér, and Vesztegz (2011) study the e¤ects of frictions (in terms of information and
o¤er costs) on outcomes and nd that enough frictions may make stability di¢ cult to achieve.
Finally, Niederle and Roth (2009) also look at an incomplete information setting in which
one side of the market (the rms) makes o¤ers to the other side (the workers) over three
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experimental periods. They study the e¤ects of o¤er structure on the information that gets
used in the nal matching and consequent market e¢ ciency.10
There is also a conceptual link between the current paper and some of the experimental
work studying nancial markets (and general equilibrium predictions) in the lab, see for in-
stance Smith (1962), Plott and Smith (1978), or the survey in Chapter 6 of Kagel and Roth
(1995). As in our paper, the underlying predictions of general equilibrium theory pertain to
outcomes, and by and large shine through in experiments; this despite the precise dynamics
leading to these outcomes not having been imposed by the experimenters.
2. Theoretical preliminaries
We start by reviewing the underlying cooperative matching model and the theoretical results
that are pertinent to our paper.
Let F and C be disjoint, nite sets. We call the elements of F foods and the elements of C
colors. The sets F and C can be metaphors for men and women, rms and workers, etc. that
are to be matched to one another in the market. A matching is a function  : F [C ! F [C
such that for all f 2 F and c 2 C,
1.  (c) 2 F [ fcg,
2.  (f) 2 C [ ffg,
3. and f =  (c) if and only if c =  (f).
Denote the set of all matchings byM. The notation (a) = a means that a is unmatched
under ; c = (f) denotes that f and c are matched under .
A preference relation is a linear, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A pref-
erence relation for a food f 2 F , denoted P (f), is understood to be over the set C [ ffg.
Similarly, for c 2 C, P (c) denotes a preference relation over F [ fcg. For simplicity and
consistency with our experimental design, we assume that each food (color) prefers any color
10There is a growing experimental literature studying centralized matching systems, e.g., Bergstrom and
Garratt (2010), Harrison and McCabe (1996), Chen and Sonmez (2006), Haruvy and Ünver (2007), Pais and
Pintér (2008), Echenique, Wilson, and Yariv (2010), Featherstone and Mayefsky (2010), and Featherstone and
Niederle (2011).
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(food) over remaining unmatched. A preference prole is a list P of preference relations for
foods and colors, i.e.,
P =

(P (f))f2F ; (P (c))c2C

:
We assume that preferences are strict. That is, no food or color is indi¤erent over two di¤erent
partners.
Denote by R(f) the weak version of P (f). That is, c0 R(f) c if either c0 = c or c0P (f)c.
The denition of R(c);the weak version of P (c), is analogous.
Fix a preference prole P . We say that a pair (c; f) blocks  if c 6= (f), c P (f) (f), and
f P (c) (c). In words, (c; f) is a blocking pair if c and f prefer to be matched to one another
over their assigned matches under . A matching is stable if there is no pair that blocks it.
(We ignore individual rationality since we restrict attention to preferences under which all
agents prefer to be matched to another agent rather than remaining unmatched.) Denote by
S(P ) the set of all stable matchings.
Gale-Shapley Theorem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) S(P ) is non empty, and there are
two matchings F and C in S(P ) such that, for all f , c, and  2 S(P ),
F (f)R(f) (f)R(f) C(f)
C(c)R(c) (c)R(c) F (c):
Note that the matchings F and C coincide when the market has a unique stable matching.
The matching F is called food optimal , while C is called color optimal. The matching F is
preferred by all foods to any other stable matching, and all colors prefer any stable matching
to F . Analogously for C . The proof of the Gale-Shapley Theorem is constructive, and uses
what is often referred to as the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm to identify one
of the extreme matchings F or C . Beyond its theoretical role in establishing existence, the
Gale-Shapley algorithm is often the algorithm used in centralized markets. For instance, the
National Resident Matching Program uses a variation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Suppose P is a preference prole for which S(P ) has an odd number K of matchings. A
median stable matching is a matching  2 S(P ) such that for all agents a 2 F [ C, (a)
occupies the K+1
2
th place in as preference among the agents in f0(a) j 0 2 S(P )g: (a) is
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as median partner among as stable-matching partners.
In general, median stable matchings are guaranteed to exist (see Teo and Sethuraman,
1998; this is also the case when K is even). In a way, median stable matchings present a
compromise between the two sides of the market. Interestingly, there are no known simple
algorithms that generate the median stable matching. Certainly, one can search for all stable
matchings of a market and then identify the median one. From a computational perspective,
however, this can potentially be quite demanding as the problem of nding all stable matchings
is computationally hard (see Guseld and Irving, 1989 for general references; Irving and
Leather, 1986 illustrate that determining the number of all stable matchings is generally #P-
complete; Cheng, 2008 shows that nding the median stable matching is hard). These results
contrast with the problem of nding a color- or food-optimal stable matching, which can be
done in polynomial time by using the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Note that the notion of stability, as well as the ranking of the di¤erent stable matchings,
are ordinal in nature. In particular, the theory does not allow for rened predictions on the
basis of how much agents prefer certain partners to others.
3. Experimental Design
Our baseline design was a decentralized market involving two groups of 8 subjects each (com-
prising the two sides of the market), which we neutrally termed colors and foods. In each
round, each subject was randomized a role (red,blue,etc. if a color; apple,banana,
etc. if a food). A subject could match with one and only one subject from the opposite group.
They derived di¤erent monetary payo¤s from matching with di¤erent subjects. All subjects
observed all potential payo¤s from a numerical matrix on the experimental interface.11 Re-
maining unmatched generated a payo¤ of 0.
Over the course of the experiment, agents were free to propose a match to any agent on the
other side of the market. At any point in time, subjects observed all current matches through
a panel of the interface. Importantly, subjects could make an o¤er while being matched, and
the target of o¤ers could be currently matched. If a matched agent accepted a new o¤er, the
previous match was undone. When receiving an o¤er, a subject had 10 seconds to respond.
11Full instructions are available at: https://sites.google.com/site/decentralizedmatching/
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Each market ended after 30 seconds of inactivity.12
Each experimental session entailed 2 practice rounds and 10 real rounds. We designed
the di¤erent markets with two factors in mind. First, in order to see whether cardinal rep-
resentations of preferences matter we chose 7 preference proles, so-called ordinal markets,
and 20 cardinal representations of them (which we spell out below). Indeed, for any ordinal
preference (say, red prefers apple to banana), there are many ways by which these preferences
can be presented cardinally (e.g., red receiving $50 or $10 for matching with apple and $5 for
matching with banana, would correspond to the same ordinal ranking). Our design entailed
7 underlying ordinal descriptions of markets and 20 markets in which cardinal presentations
were varied, and that were the ones implemented in the lab.13 Second, in order to check for
the endogenous selection of stable matches, we designed our experimental markets so that in
each of them all subjects had either one, two, or three stable match partners (in particular,
the rst case corresponds to markets with a unique stable matching).
As mentioned, for each xed number of stable match partners (ranging from 1 to 3), we
used several markets di¤ering in ordinal and cardinal preferences of market participants.14
The following is a general description of the payo¤s used.
Unique stable match partner. We used 4 di¤erent ordinal markets: aligned preference markets
(each sides participants having aligned preference rankings), markets with aligned preferences
on one side,15 a market in which a fully egalitarian matching (providing all agents the same
payo¤) which was not stable existed, and a generic market with a unique stable matching.
For the latter market, we implemented four additional cardinal treatments. In two of these we
varied how aligned the interests were across the market: that is, if  is the stable matching,
we computed the correlation of the vectors (ui())i2F and (u(i)())i2F , where ui() denotes
the payo¤ of agent i in the matching . We created one market in which the correlation
was  0:9 and one where it was 0:9. We used two additional cardinal representations: one
12In less than 5% of the markets, activity stalled and markets were terminated after 5 minutes. We discuss
the duration of markets when we describe our results.
13Recall that, in theory, the set of stable matchings depends only on the preference rankings (or ordinal
preferences) of market participants.
14The full set of matrices used are also available at: https://sites.google.com/site/decentralizedmatching/
15Alignment implies that agents on each side of the market agree on the ranking of agents on the other
market side. When preferences are aligned on one side, only the members of one side of the market are in
agreement. Alignment on either side of the market is su¢ cient to guarantee a unique stable matching.
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in which, for each agent, the di¤erence in utilities between matching with the agents kth
and k + 1th choices was 20c/ and one in which these marginal di¤erences were 70c/: These
generated 7 di¤erent cardinal markets.
Two stable match partners. We used one ordinal market in which each agent had two possible
stable match partners. These were constructed so that there were two 44 embedded markets
(so that any agent within a submarket preferred to match with anyone from that submarket
over anyone from the other). We varied the overall utilitarian e¢ ciency of each match, the
utilitarian benet of foods relative to colors from each match, the distribution within each
match16, as well as the marginal loss for either side of the market from switching from their
more preferred stable matchings to their less preferred ones (higher for foods or for colors).
Overall, we used 6 cardinal markets of this sort.
Three stable match partners. We used one ordinal market represented cardinally in 5 ways:
one in which the marginal di¤erences between utilities derived from matching with ones kth
and k+1th most preferred partners was 20c/; one in which it was 70c/; one in which for foods
it was 20c/ and for colors 70c/; one in which the reverse occurred (for foods marginal di¤erences
of 70c/ and for colors 20c/), and one in which these di¤erences were 20c/ for both sides of the
market but colorspayo¤s were all shifted up by $1.17 In these markets, while each individual
has precisely three di¤erent stable match partners, there are ve di¤erent market-wide stable
matchings.
In addition, we ran two sets of additional treatments to test for the e¤ects of market size
and bargaining power:
Large markets. We ran several treatments with larger markets, containing 15 subjects on each
side. We concentrated on markets with either a unique matching or 3 stable matchings. We
used 3 cardinal markets with a unique stable matching: aligned preferences on one side,
16Since egalitarian motives appear frequently in experiments, we were concerned that some form of altruism
would be driving our results. We therefore designed our payo¤s so that in some treatments, fully egalitarian
treatments were not stable (see the description of our markets with a unique stable matching above). Fur-
thermore, we included cardinal representations in which certain stable matches were more egalitarian than
others.
17The underlying market used is not symmetric. In particular, reversing the marginal di¤erences across
sides of the market does not lead to an equivalent market.
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments
aligned preferences with a fully egalitarian unstable matching, and unaligned preferences. We
used two markets with 3 stable matchings (individually and market-wide).
One-sided o¤ers. We also ran several sessions with 8  8 markets (payo¤s as in our baseline
treatment) in which only foods could make o¤ers (the rest of the market proceeding as before).
All sessions took place at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CAS-
SEL), using a modication of the multi-stage software. Subjects were all UCLA undergradu-
ates and each subject participated in only one session. The average payment per subject was
$39 in our baseline treatments, $61 in the large 15  15 market treatments, and $46 in the
treatments in which only foods were able to make o¤ers.18 All of these were combined with a
$5 show-up fee in our baseline treatments. Table 1 summarizes our experimental treatments.
4. Market Outcomes
We start by describing aggregate market outcomes. There are three main ndings that emerge
from our analysis. First, most market outcomes are stable. Furthermore, market outcomes
that are unstable are close to stable; they are close both in terms of the number of blocking
pairs and in terms of unrealized payo¤ gains. Second, in our treatments with three stable
partners, most agents are matched to their median stable partner. Surprisingly, even when
we handicapone side of the market, so that it cannot make any o¤ers, we continue to see
the median as the modal outcome. Last, cardinal representations of preferences a¤ect the
particular stable matchings that get selected. Specically, higher cardinal incentives to colors
18Standard deviations were $5, $3; and $4 respectively.
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Table 2: Aggregate Match Outcomes in the Baseline Treatment
make the color optimal matching more likely to be selected; similarly for foods. In all our
treatments, learning across rounds did not appear to have signicant e¤ects on neither out-
comes nor behavior. All of our results are therefore derived from an aggregation across all 10
rounds.
4.1. Stability in Experimental Markets. Table 2 summarizes the overall outcomes in
our baseline treatments. Almost all agents were matched across markets: overall 98% of the
agents (852 of 864) were paired. Furthermore, for each matched pair, we can check whether
that pair is a stable pair, it is to be matched under some stable matching.19 As the table
reports, 95% of matched pairs were stable, with little response to the type of market (in terms
of the number of stable matches).20 From the viewpoint of market-wide outcomes, 76% of
markets were fully stable, in the sense that all pairs correspond to a stable matching (and
there are no blocking pairs). Markets with three stable matchings exhibited less market-wide
stable outcomes (namely, 47%).
Even markets that were not fully stable were, in fact, close to stable. This can be seen
using di¤erent measures of proximity. One such measure is the number of blocking pairs in an
observed matching.21 Figure 1 presents empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
corresponding to the number of blocking pairs in our di¤erent treatments. The gure contains
the distribution of blocking pairs pertaining tomarkets in which outcomes were not fully stable;
19In markets with a unique stable matching, that matching is achieved when all individual pairs are stable.
20We note that the use of color and food labels in our markets did not seem to have any e¤ects on matchings.
For example, if one considers banana and mango to be associated with yellow, apple and cherry with red, and
kiwi and pear with green, there is no signicant increase in the corresponding matches relative to any other
classication.
21In our baseline treatments, when no agents are matched, the number of blocking pairs is 64, the number
of potential pairs. When a stable matching is implemented, there are 0 blocking pairs.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Blocking Pairs for Unstable Markets
including all markets would imply a big spike at 0; which corresponds to a stable matching.
In our baseline treatment, it appears that most outcomes are close to stable. Indeed, most of
the markets with unstable outcomes have only a few blocking pairs.
We can also use payo¤s to measure the distance to stability. We can compare the realized
payo¤s with those in a stable matching. We nd that agents within markets that did not
culminate in a stable matching lost between 6% and 7% of the realized total payo¤s (translat-
ing to 22c/ and 27c/ per person, respectively), the range corresponding to the di¤erent stable
matchings that could have potentially been selected in markets with multiple stable matchings
(the closest one in terms of payo¤s, or the most e¢ cient one that is the point of comparison in
Table 2). If we average these payo¤ di¤erences across all markets, stable or unstable, the loss
per person is bounded by 2% of realized earnings (between 5c/ and 6c/ per person).22 Nonethe-
less, restricting attention to individuals not matched to a stable match partner, di¤erences
become considerable, ranging from 24% and 64% per person (between 65c/ and 171c/).
Regarding time, convergence to the stable matching was rather rapid. On average, it took
22An alternative gauge for the distance from stability is the di¤erence between payo¤s in unstable market
outcomes and the payo¤s from realizing existing blocking pairs (a comparison of the payo¤s of the realized
matching with those generated by a matching that is not necessarily stable). The conclusion is the same;
existing blocking pairs do not result in substantial payo¤ gains.
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subjects 169 seconds (7) in our baseline treatment to achieve a matching. We return to the
dynamics underlying these observations in Section 7.
4.2. The Emergence of Median Stable Matches. Table 3 contains the distribution
of individual matches in our baseline markets entailing three stable match partners for each
agent. Recall that the crucial wedge between the di¤erent markets is the level and marginal
di¤erences of payo¤s within each side of the market. We use the notation of x y marginals
to denote a market in which the marginal di¤erence in utilities between one partner and the
next-best partner was x cents for colors and y cents for foods. In the 20 20 marginals market
with 100 color shift, a 100c/ (or $1) were added to the color payo¤s in the 20   20 marginals
market.
The rst observation to glean out of the table is that the median stable matching is the
modal outcome: 73% of individual matches correspond to the median stable match. This
observation holds for all of the experimental markets with three stable match partners per
person. The table focuses on the individual outcomes since those are the ones concerning the
participating agents in our markets (agents are concerned with partners, not with market-wide
outcomes).
Shifting attention to market-wide outcomes, we establish similar insights. In none of
our baseline treatments were the extreme stable matchings (food-optimal or color-optimal)
selected market-wide. Furthermore, in 44% of the markets that ended up in a fully stable
matching, the market-wide median matching, entailing all participants being matched to their
median stable match partner, was achieved. That is, under conservative criteria for scoring a
median outcome, almost half of the outcomes are median. We are being conservative because,
in most markets with a median stable matching, the (non-extremal) matchings have some
subjects matched to their optimal stable partners, and some subjects matched to their median
stable partners. Therefore, the design made the selection of the median stable matching, in
which all individuals are matched to their median partner, arguably more di¢ cult to achieve.
Recall that most markets with three stable match partners per person have ve market-
wide stable matchings. In these markets, We should emphasize that a median matching had to
be discoveredby the subjects: it is practically impossible to read the set of stable matchings
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Table 3: Cardinal E¤ects
from looking at the payo¤ tables (an 8 8 table with pairs of numbers as entries).23
These results are relevant when considering centralized systems. Indeed, absent incen-
tive compatibility concerns, most centralized clearinghouses are based on the Gale-Shapley
algorithm and implement one of the extremal stable matchings (in our case, the matching
optimal for foods or for colors). Our results suggest that decentralized markets may be more
likely to generate an intermediate stable matching. From a welfare perspective, while all
stable matchings are Pareto e¢ cient, we can compare the median and the optimal stable
matchings according to the sum of agentspayo¤s. In our markets, the median stable match-
ings always generate a utilitarian welfare level that is (weakly) in between that generated by
the extremal matchings. However, which extremal matching generates the maximal utilitarian
welfare (food-optimal or color-optimal) depends on the market. Therefore, the utilitarian wel-
fare merit of a centralized system over a decentralized system may depend on which extremal
matching is being implemented.24
We note that decentralized matching markets appear to comprise another incidence in
which a computationally hard problem (see Cheng, 2008 and Guseld and Irving, 1989) is
solved quickly in the laboratory. Granted, the set of markets presented in our experiments is
a rather selected one, but it is intuitively hard for a single person to choose a median outcome
out of the set of stable matchings in our experiments (for a similar observation regarding the
NP-complete four-coloring problem, see Kearns, Suri, and Montfort, 2006).
Table 3 also suggests the impact of cardinal representations of preferences. Indeed, par-
ticipants on the side of the market (foods or colors) having more to loseby forgoing their
most preferred match tend to partner with their most preferred match at higher frequen-
23The asymmetry between, say, the 70   20 marginals market and the 20   70 marginals market is a
consequence of our underlying ordinal market not being symmetric across the two market sides. We return to
the selection of these outcomes when we discuss the e¤ects of cardinal incentives below.
24We note that in some markets the median stable matching generates a higher utilitarian welfare than the
average generated by the extremal matchings.
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cies (signicant at any conventional levels). We return to the e¤ects of cardinal preference
representations on outcomes in Section 6.1.
5. Robustness to Bargaining Protocol and Market Size
There are two natural dimensions that are important to consider when contemplating the
robustness of our results: market size and the bargaining power a¤orded to each side of the
market.
Market Size. Our treatments involving markets with 30 participants (15 on each side)
suggest that our observations from the baseline treatments are not special to the volume of 16
individuals engaged in the market. Indeed, our larger markets generated very similar results
to those yielded by our baseline treatments. In terms of markets created in the lab, a size
of 30 is quite large. It does not come near the much larger actual (say, medical residents)
matching markets, but it is a comfort that the duplication of the size of our baseline markets
does not upset the results.
Regarding matching outcomes, in the large markets, 89% of individual matches were stable.
In terms of market-wide outcomes, 67% of matchings were stable, and the number of blocking
pairs within unstable markets was very small, all entailing less than 5 blocking pairs (see Figure
1). Interestingly, the seemingly more complex markets with three stable matchings always
culminated in a stable matching in the 15  15 markets. As one might expect, convergence
was slower in these large markets: The average duration of a round was 321 seconds (53).
As for the selected stable match partners, results are similar to those in our baseline
treatments, though arguably more extreme. In the large market treatments, 93% of individual
matches were median matches (the rest evenly split between food-optimal and color-optimal).
The market-wide stable matchings were exclusively median stable matchings.25
Unilateral O¤ers. A natural possible explanation for the prevalence of the median
stable matches is that, in our experiments, participants on both sides of the market could
make o¤ers. Intuitively, there is a wedge between our experimental design and the setting of
the Gale-Shapley algorithm in which only one side makes o¤ers while the other side decides
which o¤ers to accept. The Gale-Shapley algorithm produces the optimal matching for one
25In a few cases, some agents happen to have the same partner in the median as in an extremal matching.
Such matches were not counted as medians in the individual-level statistics.
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side, so it is possible that allowing both sides of the market to make o¤ers is at the root of
the frequent median matches we observe. This conjecture is interesting particularly in view
of the fact that several real-world matching markets that operate in a decentralized manner
allow one side greater (if not sole) responsibility for making o¤ers (e.g., the job market for
academics, the marriage market in certain cultures, etc.). To test this, we ran markets in
which only one side could make o¤ers: in our unilateral treatment, only foods could propose
matches. We nd very similar results to our baseline treatment, namely that most outcomes
are stable and correspond to median outcomes.
In our unilateral treatments, 98% of subjects were matched. 87% of these individual
matches were stable, without great variation across the types of markets.26 At the market
level, 43% of the markets culminated in a stable matching. However, much as in our baseline
treatments, resulting unstable matchings were very close to stable ones. In fact, 73% of the
unstable matchings corresponded to a stable matching in which one pair of participants was
unmatched. The convergence in these markets was somewhat faster than in our baseline
treatments: rounds lasted on average 145 seconds (10).
Regarding selection, two important observations emerge. First, in markets with only
two stable matchings, the stable matchings favored by foods (the proposers) are much more
frequent. In fact, 91% of the matches are food-optimal, which is signicantly greater than the
observed 61% in our baseline treatments (at any conventional condence levels). For these
markets, results are consistent with the Gale-Shapley intuition. Nonetheless, the results for
markets with a median stable matching (those corresponding to markets with three stable
match partners for each individual) are very similar to those in our baseline treatments.
61% of the individual stable matches are median stable matches, compared to 73% when
both sides make o¤ers (44% of the market outcomes had all agents matched to the median
partner). There is an increase in the number of matches that are optimal to the proposing
side, from 11% to 27%, but this comes mainly at the expense of matches that are optimal for
the receiving side.
26The percentages are 83%, 96%;and 82% for markets with one, two, and three stable match partners per
person, respectively.
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6. The Effects of Cardinal Incentives
The notion of stability depends on agentsordinal preferences, not on specic cardinal utility
values. In fact, in our data the likelihood a stable matching emerges does not seem to depend
on the cardinal representation of preferences. In principle, however, which stable matching
gets selected may depend on the cardinal utility representations. Existing theories provide
little guidance as to which stable matchings are to be expected in di¤erent (decentralized)
contexts. In that respect, our experiments are the rst to suggest some market aspects that
a¤ect the selection of stable matchings.
Our design entailed several markets composed of identical ordinal preference proles, but
di¤erent cardinal utility representations of these preferences. Focusing on those markets, there
are two consistent patterns we observe. First, higher cardinal incentives for one side of the
market make that sides optimal matching more likely to emerge. Second, equality of payo¤s
across match partners makes a matching more likely, as long as it is stable.
6.1. Selection of Extremal Matchings. Table 3 reports the distribution of stable matches
across the di¤erent cardinal representations of preferences in markets in which each participant
had three stable match partners.
The table makes transparent the importance of cardinal incentives, keeping ordinal incen-
tives xed. The side that benets more from getting a more preferred match, in terms of
marginal increases or absolute payo¤s, tends to generate its preferred stable matches at signif-
icantly greater frequencies (as mentioned, the asymmetry between, say, the 70  20 marginals
market and the 20 70 marginals market is due to the fact that our underlying ordinal market
is not symmetric across the two market sides). It is only when marginal incentives are balanced
that we see some extreme stable matches of both types (food-optimal and color-optimal).
We note that while cardinal incentives a¤ect the distribution of extremal stable matches,
they do not appear to a¤ect the generated fraction of median stable matches.
6.2. Social Preferences. One may suspect that inherent attributes of our marketscardi-
nal representations make the median stable matches more appealing to subjects. In particular,
there is a long legacy in experimental economics identifying subjectstendency to satisfy some
taste for egalitarian or fairoutcomes (the literature has suggested di¤erent types of social
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preferences of the sort, for surveys see, e.g., Chapter 4 in Kagel and Roth, 1995 and Fehr and
Gächter, 2000). Such considerations may be important since di¤erent cardinal representations
of preferences may make one stable matching more or less appealing when having equality of
payo¤s in mind.
We analyzed these e¤ects in two ways. We rst explored egalitarian concerns by intro-
ducing some markets with a salient egalitarian but unstable matching (see the description in
Section 3). These are markets in which one unstable matching entailed identical payo¤s to
all market participants, and comparable utilitarian welfare to that generated by the stable
matchings.27 Subjects consistently failed to select the egalitarian matching. In our base-
line treatments, none of these markets ended up in an unstable (and potentially more equal)
matching outcome. Our larger markets (in which more payo¤ variation could be introduced),
generated similar ndings.
For example, we ran one 15  15 market in which there was an unstable matching under
which all agents received exactly $4; there was a unique stable matching in which the average
payo¤ was also $4, but which was much more unequal.28 While the nal outcome in these
markets was not always fully stable (in some instances a few blocking pairs remained), subjects
clearly avoided the egalitarian unstable matching.
We used the markets with two stable matchings to assess the e¤ect of cardinal utilities on
the distribution of matchings between those optimal for foods and those optimal for colors
(see Section 3).29 We nd that when the dispersion of payo¤s is relatively high in the color-
optimal matching, markets tend to achieve the food-optimal matching; when the dispersion is
relatively low, markets tend to settle on the color-optimal matching. Specically, we computed
the coe¢ cient of variation of agentspayo¤s in a given matching: this is the standard deviation
of payo¤s divided by the mean payo¤. The coe¢ cient is a scale freemeasure of the dispersion
27By specifying identical payo¤s to all market participants, we avoided the challenge of identifying the
individuals that are relevant for a subjects social preferences.
28Its Gini index was 26. For a countrys income distribution, this is in the Scandinavian range, but it
appears starkly heterogeneous compared to the alternative of perfect egalitarianism with no e¢ ciency loss.
29Recall that each of these markets was constructed to embed two smaller 4  4 embedded markets, that
allowed us to gain more payo¤ variations. Two notes are in order: 1. The embedding of the submarkets
was e¤ective - indeed, there were only 7% cross-o¤ers and only 1% cross-matches; 2. In these markets, 96%
of matches were stable, providing additional supporting evidence to the robustness of our results with respect
to market size.
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Figure 2: Volume of Blocking Pairs over Time within Rounds
in payo¤s across agents. We computed the ratio of the coe¢ cient of variation at the food
optimal matching and the coe¢ cient at the color-optimal matching. When the ratio is above
the median ratio in our data, the color-optimal matching obtains 36:7% of the time (8:8%);
when it is below the median it obtains 75:0% of the time (6:3%). The di¤erence between
these values is signicant at any conventional levels of condence. The implication is that
when the variance in payo¤s at the color-optimal matching is relatively high, we tend to get
more food-optimal outcomes, and vice-versa.
To summarize, our results suggest that while some egalitarian or fairness considerations
play a role in selecting outcomes, they are not so strong as to trump stability.
It should be noted that while distributional concerns are a prevalent concern in exper-
imental economics, our results cannot be directly compared with the extant experimental
bargaining literature. Indeed, the nature of bargaining in our experiments is substantially
di¤erent from other experiments, such as the dictator game, where the compromise between
the two sides is obvious. In fact, it is far from obvious how to nd the median matchings in
the markets we tested.30
30Our markets are complex enough that eyeballing a stable matching is arguably impossible (and as men-
tioned above, from a computational perspective, nding the set of stable matchings in generally a di¢ cult
problem). Furthermore, there are no simple algorithms for nding the median stable matching.
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Table 4: Market Dynamics Aggregate Statistics
7. Market dynamics
We now turn to the dynamics that led to the outcomes we have been describing. Overall,
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the number of blocking pairs over the duration of a round,
where the thickness of the curves corresponds to one standard error below and above the
mean at each point. The gure suggests that blocking pairs vanish over time, and they do so
at a relatively fast pace. When 20% of a round had elapsed, markets with a unique stable
matching had on average roughly 18 blocking pairs, similar to those in which each agent had
three stable match partners. When 95% of the duration of the round had elapsed, only the
markets with three stable matches per person still exhibit some blocking pairs (consistent with
the percentage of such markets converging to a matching that is close to, but not precisely,
stable). This is in line with the rapid convergence documented in Section 4. Regardless of the
number of stable match partners available for each participant, most markets end with very
few blocking pairs; and after a relatively short interval of time, most blocking pairs are traded
away.31
Another important feature is the relatively small volume of o¤ers apparent in our experi-
mental sessions. The rst column of Table 4 presents the volume of o¤ers by the number of
stable match partners each market participant has. The number of o¤ers seems intuitively
small the number of distinct o¤ers (from both sides) in each market is 128; while the Gale-
Shapley algorithm would entail between 12  16 o¤ers in most of the markets. The volume of
o¤ers depends to some extent on the cardinal incentives. Focusing on the markets discussed
above with three stable match partners per person, in which the overall average number of
o¤ers per market is 61; the markets described as 70-70 and 20-20 have on average 65 and 69
31A similar image emerges for our additional treatments entailing unilateral o¤ers or larger markets.
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o¤ers. The other, unbalanced, markets have between 45 and 49 o¤ers on average.32
Another important feature is the relatively small volume of o¤ers apparent in our experi-
mental sessions. The rst column of Table 4 presents the volume of o¤ers made in each market
overall. The number of o¤ers seems intuitively small the number of distinct o¤ers (from both
sides) in each market is 128; while the Gale-Shapley algorithm would entail between 12  16
steps in most of the markets.33 The volume of o¤ers depends to some extent on the cardinal
incentives. Focusing on the markets discussed above with three stable match partners per
person, in which the overall average number of o¤ers per market is 61; the markets described
as 70-70 and 20-20 have on average 65 and 69 o¤ers. The other, unbalanced, markets have
between 45 and 49 o¤ers on average.34
The overall statistics of the dynamics show some degree of explorationon the part of
our subjects. An o¤er from agent i to j is a repeat o¤er if i o¤ered matching to j at least
once before in the round. A match between i and j is a repeat match if i and j have been
matched before and the the match was broken. The right-most columns of Table 4 reveal
fairly low numbers of repeated o¤ers and matches, suggesting that situations where subjects
get matched, then try matching with others, only to later re-match with previous partners,
are relatively infrequent.
We analyze the underpinnings of the dynamics that ensued, trying to match the scope of
market activity with the insights on the likelihood of specic stable matchings, particularly
the median stable ones. We start by assessing some existing theoretical models that allow
for unravelling of matching markets sequentially. We then proceed to analyze the individual
choices, pertaining to making as well as accepting o¤ers, over time.
32Interestingly, the di¤erent extremal matchings are not associated with a higher volume of o¤ers on either
side. Our markets with two stable match partners for each participant are a good testing ground: in markets
in which the food-optimal matching was realized, 48%  2% of the o¤ers were by foods, whereas in markets
in which the color-optimal matching was realized, 56% 3% of the o¤ers were by foods.
33In two markets with a unique stable matching the number of steps the Gale-Shapley algorithm requires
is either 22 or 36; depending on the proposing side.
34Interestingly, the di¤erent extremal matchings are not associated with a higher volume of o¤ers on either
side. Our markets with two stable match partners for each participant are a good testing ground: in markets
in which the food-optimal matching was realized, 48%  2% of the o¤ers were by foods, whereas in markets
in which the color-optimal matching was realized, 56% 3% of the o¤ers were by foods.
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7.1. Dynamic Models and Simulations. The theoretical literature on dynamics in
matching markets is not very developed.35 The leading model for achieving a stable matching
is the random paths to stability model of Roth and Vande Vate (1990). That model species
a process in which, starting from some matching at time t, say t, the set of all blocking
pairs is calculated. One of these blocking pairs is chosen at random and created. That is,
the corresponding color and food in that blocking pair get matched and their partners in t
(if they exist) become single. The resulting matching is dened to be t+1 and the process
continues iteratively: Roth and Vande Vate (1990) proved that this dynamic converges to a
stable matching with probability one.36
The random paths to stability process is inherently independent of the cardinal represen-
tation of preferences. In order to allow for such dependence we consider some variations of
the basic model in which the probability a blocking pair forms depends on the welfare gain
for the agents participating. Specically, we consider two variations of the model:
 Uniform. As in the original Roth and Vande Vate (1990) setting, given a matching t,
all blocking pairs are equally likely to match and generate t+1.
 Exponential. Given a matching t, let gf;c be the gain in the sum of payo¤s for food f
and color c if they match. So gf;c is the sum of monetary payments that f and c get if
they match, after subtracting the payments f and c would get from their matches under
t. We assume the blocking pair (f; c) forms with probability proportional to exp(gf;c),
where  is a sensitivity parameter.37 When  is very low, the model approximates the
uniform setting. As  grows, blocking pairs that generate the greatest pairwise welfare
gain become increasingly likely.38
In order to assess these models vis-à-vis our experimental results, we simulated these
variations of the random paths to stability model using some of our experimental markets.
35Recently, there has been some work on decentralized matching processes that generate stable matchings
with some imposed market structure, say allowing only one side of the market to make o¤ers in sequence. See
the literature review above for references.
36Blum, Roth, and Rothblum (1997) study a related process leading to stability for which the initial matching
is one in which all blocking pairs are comprised of unmatched agents.
37This process is reminiscent of the network formation process studied by Jackson and Watts (2002).
38We also ran powermodels, where (f; c) forms with probability proportional to gkf;c. The results are
similar.
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Table 5: Simulation Results of Random Blocking Pairs Dynamics
The markets entailing three stable matches for each subject are particularly useful  they
correspond to a unique ordinal preference prole, and generated persistent selection patterns
of the stable matchings (in terms of the predominance of the median stable matching and the
comparative statics regarding cardinal representations).
Ideally, the model would conform to the data in three ways. First, outcomes should be
stable matchings. Second, the selection of stable matchings should be similar to the selection
observed in our experiments, including a high incidence of median matchings. Third, the main
features of the dynamic paths taken over time should be similar to those observed in our data.
We ran 10,000 simulations of each model using the underlying preferences of our markets
entailing three stable match partners per participant. The main results are in Table 5. We
present the results for the 20   20and 70   20 treatments; these are two instances of
the same (ordinal) market with three stable match partners (the modelspredictions for the
20  20 markets would be identical to those corresponding to the 70  70 markets). Note that
the last row of the table has the experimental results. The three dynamics are guaranteed,
by the result of Roth and Vande Vate (1990), to converge to a stable matching, hence we
replicate the rst aspect of the data by design.
The results on selection depend on the sensitivity of the dynamics to the cardinal gains
in payo¤s. The uniform model predicts the selection in the 20   20 market reasonably well,
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but gets the 70   20 market wrong. In the exponential model, when we choose a relatively
large value of , we see convergence to the median matching; so we can infer that when
the probability of a blocking pair is sensitive to the cardinal gain in the pair, we tend to
generate many median matchings. Nonetheless, for all values of , the models have problems
predicting the large observed number of median matches in the 70  20 market. In addition,
the simulations underestimate the frequency of food-optimal matches. Only for the 20   20
market does the uniform distribution over blocking pairs get close to the number of food-
optimal matches, but generates too few median matches.
As a description of the dynamic path taken to stability, we focused on the volume of o¤ers
made. The uniform distribution over blocking pairs gets the volume of o¤ers wrong by an
order of magnitude. For the exponential model, however, there are values of  that would
replicate the mean volume of o¤ers. These values of  also predict the selection of matchings
in the 20   20, but not the 70   20 market. Furthermore, while the mean value of o¤ers is
right, the variation in the number of o¤ers in the simulations is substantially higher than that
observed in our experiments (the standard deviation is consistently of the order of magnitude
of the mean number of o¤ers). There are frequently realized dynamics with much larger, and
much smaller, numbers of o¤ers than what we see in the data, even when the parameters are
calibrated so that on average the number of o¤ers corresponds to what we see in the data.39
The simulations also display more repeat o¤ers (f makes an o¤er to c more than once,
or vice versa) than those we document experimentally. For example, when blocking pairs
are generated uniformly, 91% of matches in our simulations are repeat matches. In order to
address this feature of our experimental markets, we also simulated the above versions of the
model without allowing for repeat o¤ers. Such an exercise leads to very infrequent ultimate
stable matchings (appearing in less than 5% of the simulated markets). As a result, we rule
these alternative models as not tting the basic attributes of the data.
In addition, we considered a variation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in which the proposer
is selected at random and makes o¤ers in order of their preferences, as in the original algorithm.
Responders hold on to their best available o¤er (and make an o¤er to a superior potential
partner that has not rejected them yet if chosen as proposers at a later stage). By construction,
39This variation causes the mean number of o¤ers in our simulations to di¤er slightly across the cardinal
treatments when blocking pairs are determined uniformly, independent of payo¤s.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of O¤ers for Di¤erent Volumes of Blocking Pairs
such a (random) procedure involves no rematches. Intuitively, since the original Gale-Shapley
algorithm generates the stable matching preferred by the proposing side, providing both sides
with equal shots of making o¤ers seems to potentially shift outcomes toward intermediate
solutions. Unfortunately, this dynamic process also generates very few stable matchings (4%
of 10; 000 simulations of our three stable-match partners market), and a lower incidence of
the median matching than our uniformdynamic described above (only 37% of simulations
culminating in a stable matching corresponded to the median matching).
7.2. Individual Dynamics. We now proceed to the main determinants of subjectsbe-
havior over time. We consider the factors driving market participants to make and accept
o¤ers. There are three layers to our analysis: 1. What makes o¤ers likely? 2. Conditional on
an o¤er made, to whom is it directed? 3. Conditional on receiving an o¤er, when is it likely
to be accepted?
Considering the generation of o¤ers, we start by noting that o¤ers appear to be driven by
the volume of potential blocking pairs in the market. This could be deduced indirectly from
the evidence showing how blocking pairs vanish over time. Figure 3 illustrates directly the
correlation between volume of o¤ers and number of blocking pairs (that will be echoed in the
regression analysis below).
We now turn to the target of an o¤er, addressing the question: conditional on an agent
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Table 6: Conditional Logit Results for O¤er Targets and O¤er Acceptances
making an o¤er, who does the o¤er go to? We use a discrete choice model to identify the
variables that induce a subject to make a particular o¤er. The rst column of Table 6 contains
the results of a conditional logit estimation explaining o¤er targets (where errors are clustered
by subject and marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean values of the regressors are reported).
We use the following regressors, some of them are continuous variables while others are dum-
mies. Payo¤ advantage is the increase in payo¤ to the subject if the o¤er is accepted; the
same variable followed by dis a dummy that takes the value of 1 when Payo¤ advantage is
positive. Blocking Pair is a dummy for when the pair formed by the proposer and the receiver
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is a blocking pair. Number of rejections counts the number of times that the recipient has
rejected the proposer. Fairness is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the proposers
rank in the recipients preference list, and the recipients rank in the proposers preference
list;40 and Recipient matched is a dummy variable for whether the recipient is matched. We
interacted all the variables with a dummy for the second half of the round of the market, to
detect changes in behavior late in the market.
The ndings are very intuitive. As remarked above, whether an o¤er is made is a¤ected
by the presence of blocking pairs. In Table 6 we see that blocking pairs explain who receives
o¤ers as well; the dummy variable Blocking Pair is signicant. The results are evidence of a
certain degree of sophistication by the subjects: both the own payo¤ advantage from forming
a pair (as captured by Payo¤ advantage), and the partners payo¤ advantage (captured by
the pair forming a blocking pair) are taken into account. A fairness wedge, and the potential
partner being matched both reduce the likelihood of an o¤er in a signicant, but more limited
way. The number of past rejections increases the probability of an o¤er (possibly capturing
the payo¤ gains of proposing to agents that give many agents high payo¤s, in treatments with
correlated preferences). In addition, for the most part, interaction terms corresponding to
behavior further along within a round are not signicant.
The second column in Table 6 considers the factors behind the acceptance of an o¤er.
If an agent receives an o¤er, when does he or she accept it? We use a binary logit model
(errors clustered by subject, marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean of the regressors reported).
Recipient matched in this regression is a dummy for whether the recipient of the o¤er is
matched before receiving the o¤er. The results are in line with those seen for proposers.
O¤ers are likely to be accepted if they result in higher payo¤s. One somewhat puzzling
nding is that subjects are more likely to accept an o¤er when they are matched than when
they are not (as captured by the signicance of the Recipient matched variable). This could
possibly reect some form of selection: desirable partners tend to get many o¤ers.41 Echoing
40A specication using the di¤erence in payo¤s obtains similar results
41An alternative explanation is that unmatched recipients are more often found at the start of a round, when
they may be waiting on the response to an o¤er of their own, or hope to get better o¤ers. This explanation
is inconsistent, however, with the insignicance of the interaction term with the second half of the round.
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proposerss behavior, fairness has a positive impact on receivers responses. In addition,
acceptance patterns appear stable throughout the round.
8. Conclusions
We reported results from an array of experiments looking at decentralized matching markets.
With respect to outcomes, there are three main insights that shine through. First, decentral-
ized markets very often culminate in stable matchings. Second, there is a persistent pattern in
the selection of a stable matching: the median stable matching has very strong drawing power.
Third, cardinal representations of preferences impact the distribution of selected matchings
that are not the median one. Roughly speaking, the side of the market that has more to
losefrom forgoing their favorite stable matching, is more likely to implement it.
These results are important from a market design perspective. On the one hand, they re-
inforce the appeal to create institutions that implement a stable matching. Indeed, the results
suggest that decentralized processes that precede or follow a centralized matching protocol
would push outcomes toward stability (and, if not generated by the centralized mechanism
in place, may produce ine¢ ciencies having to do with the changes yielding an ultimate sta-
ble matching). On the other hand, they suggest some important comparisons that underlie
the decision to use a centralized clearinghouse to begin with. Many implemented centralized
matching markets use a variation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm that, absent incentive compat-
ibility concerns, generate extremal stable matchings (favored by one side of the market). Our
decentralized processes often generated the median stable matching. The utilitarian welfare
comparison of these matchings may therefore be important in determining when centralized
clearinghouses could be particularly benecial.
With respect to dynamics, the arrival and selection of stable matchings occurs rather
rapidly (in terms of both time and volume of o¤ers). The action in our experiments is mainly
driven by an attempt to exploit blocking pairs: the timing of o¤ers, and who they are made
to, are to a large extent explained by the existence of blocking pairs. Nonetheless, existing
models that generate stable matchings through the sequential formation of blocking pairs à
la Roth and Vande Vate (1990) do not match basic features of our data. There is therefore
room for future theoretical work on dynamic matching processes that would likely provide
foundational guidance on the selection of stable matchings in decentralized markets.
An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching 30
Another interesting avenue for future research pertains to incomplete information. Our
experiments were designed as a rst step toward understanding how decentralized markets
operate and were constructed to match the cooperative game theoretical setting which, under
complete information, predicts outcomes to be in the core, i.e. comprise stable matchings. We
do not have an equivalent theoretical benchmark for matching under incomplete information.
Nonetheless, in many large markets such as those for medical residents, law clerks, or mar-
riage partners, participants presumably have incomplete information on some participants
preferences. While the theoretical underpinnings of the core under incomplete information
are still developing, we nd this an important direction to pursue both theoretically and
experimentally.
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